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The analysis of the links between trade policy and labor market outcomes has developed in recent decades,
prompt up by the concerns about the effects of the increasing globalization process in which trade plays a major
role. In this work we analyze the impact of the increase in trade liberalization, as a consequence of Mercosur’s
creation on employment, income and wage dispersion at the individual level. To this aim we use data from the
Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the period 1988 and 1996 and apply impact evaluation techniques in
order to isolate the effects of trade reforms from other policies at work during the period. One of the most robust
findings that emerge using difference-in-difference regressions as well as double robust estimators and inverse
probability weighting, is that in the period following Mercosur’s creation there was an increase in monthly earnings
and hourly labor earnings as well as a significant increase in the probability of unemployment and increased wage
dispersion.
JEL code: F02, F16, J23, J31
Keywords: Trade, Labor markets, Employment, Wages, Trade and labor market interactionsIntroduction
The analysis of the impact of increasing globalization on
labor markets has been a focus of research in the last
decades. Initially studies focused on developed countries
and analyzed how opening to trade would affect workers
with different skills (Freeman 1995; Feenstra and Hanson
1999). As developing countries start to open up their
economies and data become available these countries also
turn out to be a focus of analysis. Nevertheless, so far the
result are not clear cut, and there is mixed evidence on
the effects of trade liberalization on labor markets. One of
the most puzzling findings is that there is evidence of a
skill-bias in labor demand and increased wage inequality
as a result of increasing trade liberalization, both for de-
veloped and developing countries (Attanasio, Goldberg,
and Pavcnik 2004; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Robbins
1996; Perry and Olarreaga 2007).
In this work we propose to analyze the impact of the
increase in trade liberalization in Uruguay, as a conse-
quence of Mercosur’s creation on wages, unemployment
and wage dispersion at the individual level. To this aimCorrespondence: apeluffo@iecon.ccee.edu.uy
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in any medium, provided the original work is pwe apply impact evaluation techniques using data from
the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the period
1988 and 1996, i.e. before and after Mercosur’s creation.
A contribution of this paper is the use of the difference-
in-difference approach, which is not common in trade em-
pirical works, to analyze the impact of trade liberalization
at the household level for a small developing country. In
particular, the matching and double difference (MDID)
approach has the advantage of removing the effects of
common shocks. This make possible to isolate the effect
of trade reforms from other policies during the period,
providing in this manner a more accurate analysis of the
impact of trade openness.
This work structures as follows: after the introduction,
in section 2 we present some background literature. In
section 3 we describe briefly some features of the trade
liberalization process in Uruguay. In the fourth section
we present the empirical implementation. In the fifth
section we present the results and finally some conclud-
ing remarks.Literature review
It is worth devoting some words to the links between
trade policy and labor market outcomes. Trade policiesen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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of employment, on wages and wage differentials, and on
labor market institutions and policies. Nevertheless labor
and social policies can also influence the outcomes of
trade policies in terms of growth of output, employment
and the distribution of income.a
Trade liberalization is associated with both job de-
struction and job creation. The net employment effect in
the short run depends mainly on country specific factors
such as the functioning of the labor market. In the long
run, the efficiency gains due to trade liberalization are
expected to generate positive employment effects, either
in terms of quantity or quality of jobs or a combination
of both.
The theoretical literature provides insights into the
process of job destruction and job creation following
trade liberalization and illustrates how different country
characteristics can affect temporary and permanent em-
ployment at the sectoral or country level (Lee, Vivarelli
and Office 2006).
The classical link between trade and income inequality
is based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem developed
in a model that assumed full employment. According to
this theorem inequality is most likely to increase in
industrialized countries as a consequence of trade with
developing countries because the former are well
endowed with skilled labor. While in developing coun-
tries is expected to observe a decline in inequality. This
would happen because developing countries are typically
well endowed with low skill labor relative to developed
countries. With a move to free trade, developing coun-
tries will be more competitive in low skill intensive
sectors which will expand. The increased demand for
low skilled workers, who typically belong to the poorer
segments of the population, will lead to an increase in
their wages relative to the wages of skilled workers.
Thus, the theoretical literature predicts that trade
liberalization raises average income levels, and also some
contributions of the theoretical growth literature suggest
that trade also stimulates growth.b
Traditional trade models assume full employment,
though some workers may be better or worse off in the
long run due to changes in wages. It is assumed that on
average, individuals would be better off as a result of
overall efficiency gains triggered by trade liberalization.
However, many economies are not characterized by full
employment.c In this case trade liberalization would
reduce demand for workers mainly in import competing
sectors and unemployment would increase.
Recent trade models point out that adjustment processes
may not only be observed between sectors but also within
sectors. The “new-new trade models” that introduce firm
heterogeneity and fixed-market entry costs predict that
trade reform will trigger job creation and job destructionin all sectors, as both net-exporting and net-importing sec-
tors will be characterized by expanding high-productivity
firms and low-productivity firms that will shrink or close
down. This implies that an important reshuffling of jobs
takes place within sectors.
Even though the economic literature has produced a
large number of empirical studies analyzing the effects
of trade on labor market outcomes, so far no clear mes-
sage emerges from this literature.
Milner and Wright (1998) for Mauritius find increases
in employment after trade liberalization while Harrison
and Revenga (1995) for several developing and transitional
countries find increases in employment for developing
countries and reductions for transitional economies.
Regarding to wages the works by Rama (2003) and
Lopez (2004) find short-run reductions in wages after
trade liberalization but positive long run effects, i.e. in-
creases in wages in the long run which are attributed to
growth effects.
Most empirical works for Latin America suggest that
trade liberalization has led to an increase in both income
and wage inequality and a skill bias of labor demand
(Robbins 1996; Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004;
Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Perry and Olarreaga 2007;
Barraud 2009; Wood 1997; Slaughter 2000). Dollar and
Kraay (2004) find that trade openness affects income distri-
bution positively. A similar result is obtained by Behrman,
Birdsall and Székely (2000) for a set of Latin American
countries. Dollar and Kraay (2004) find that trade openness
affects income distribution positively. A similar result is
obtained by Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) for a set
of Latin American countries. However, Sanchez-Paramo
and Schady (2003) find the opposite result in six Latin
American countries, where trade volumes would negatively
affect inequality. Spilimbergo et al. (1999) also find that
trade openness would be associated with higher inequality,
whereas Edwards (1998) does not find any significant effect
of trade on income distribution. Galiani and Porto (2006)
find a negative effect of tariff reforms on the wage levels
in Argentina.d More recently Barraud (2009) analyzing the
effect of trade liberalization on wages for Argentina using
difference-in-differences and matching techniques, finds
that labor market and poverty indicators deteriorated in
the 1988–1998 liberalization period in Argentina.
For the Uruguayan case Casacuberta and Vaillant
(2002) find that the higher the tariff reduction the higher
was the reduction in employment and wages at the in-
dustry level in the 90s. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003)
working for the same period, find that Mercosur trade
flows have negatively affected the level of industry em-
ployment in Uruguay. However these results are obtain
trough correlations so they are not controlling for other
forces that may have induced different manufacturing
activities to change their employment levels.
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does not appear to allow for any general conclusion on
the link between trade liberalization and income distri-
bution and the impression arises that this link is country
and situation specific.e
Hence, so far empirical research into the link between
trade liberalization and market labor outcomes has pro-
duced mixed results. While the evidence for Asia seems
to confirm a reduction in inequality following trade
liberalization in Latin America inequality seems to have
increased.
The only general conclusion that may be justified is
that employment effects depend on a large number of
country-specific factors, aside differences in the quality
of the data and econometric issues of the studies.
One shortcoming of the studies is that they fail to
distinguish the different possible causes of employment
changes. Labor market policies, macroeconomic policies,
technological change or movements along the business
cycle are only a few examples of factors that may affect
an economy’s employment level.f
As we have already mentioned we should keep in mind
the difficulty of isolating the effects of trade from other
policies implemented simultaneously with trade reform.
In most studies, the identification of trade effects relies on
the comparison before and after a policy change without
controlling for other policies at work. As a consequence,
this approach attributes changes originating from other
sources to trade policy. Most studies use data covering
only a short time period after the reform which implies
that the results can be heavily affected by the cyclical be-
havior of the economy. The difference-in-difference meth-
odology should eliminate the effects of common shocks
providing so a more precise description of the impact of
trade policy as we explain in Section 4. We try to improve
over Barraud’s study by using a double-robust estimator
which allows obtaining unbiased estimates when there are
confounding factors (e.g. changes in technology, in labor
supply, in institutional settings and other policies that may
affect the outcome as well as the probability of treatment).
Trade openness in Uruguay
As most countries in the region, Uruguay has pursued
an import substitution policy from the early 1930s to
mid-70s (Bértola 1991). Since 1974 trade policy has been
characterized by a continuous reduction in tariff bar-
riers, both in the number of tariffs levels and in average
rates. Also non-tariff barriers were eliminated, remaining
mainly References Prices and Minimum Export Prices.
Nevertheless, the number of goods subject to Reference
Prices and Minimum Export Prices experienced a dra-
matic reduction.g
In 1991 Uruguay signed the Asuncion Treaty aimed to
the creation of the Southern Common Market(MERCOSUR) with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which
implied a deepening in the liberalization process.h In 1995
the custom union was functioning for the 85 per cent of
the tariff lines, though the four countries have kept a list
of exemptions for some goods, and it was still an imper-
fect custom union.
The integration process was verified in a context of
the return to democracy and growth in the region, along
with policies of trade and financial liberalization and
stabilization. The creation of the MERCOSUR decreases
the cost of access to partners’ markets and could imply
an enlargement of the market, which could allow
reaching economies of scale. Nevertheless, the degree of
development and economic size between countries and
regions is very uneven which may act as an impediment
to deeper integration.
After MERCOSUR creation there has been an import-
ant rise of Uruguayan trade with the big partners:
Argentina and Brazil, for both imported and exported
goods. The average values for the period 1975–1978
show that exports to Argentina and Brazil were 22 per
cent of total Uruguayan exports while this figure raise to
46 per cent in the period 1994–1996.i
In 1995 the tariff structure of the bloc was adopted.
Thus, the protection levels in Uruguay, regarding extra-
regional trade are defined basically through two key in-
struments: tariffs and the exchange rate.
On the other hand, the exchange rate was used as an
instrument to reduce inflation, and domestic currency
was strongly appreciated during most of the period ana-
lyzed. In the 90s the policy designed to reduce inflation
was to tie the peso to the dollar (crawling peg or “ancla
cambiaria”). The Stabilization Plan was triggered by an
inflation that reached the three digits, in January 1991,
which was implemented in 1992. The monetary aspect
of the plan was the use of the domestic currency pegged
to the dollar. This was instrumented by the Central Bank
through a band regime with pre-announced ex-change
rates. This policy was successful in reducing inflation
which fell steadily since 1991 up to the year 2002. The
cost of this policy was to make exports less competitive,
mainly outside the region, since Brazil and Argentina
also implemented similar stabilization policies.j
In Table 1 we present the evolution of manufacturing
gross product, imports and exports for the period 1988
up to 2001, while in Table 2 we present the evolution of
the Openness Index and the Import Penetration and
Export ratio. We can observe the increase in openness
in the three indicators considered. They increase steadily
up to 2000 and contract in 2001 along with the Argen-
tinean crisis.
Regarding to labor market institutions, during the mili-
tary coup in the country (1973–1984) collective bargaining
was proscribed, but labor unions regained the right to
Table 1 Evolution of GDP, imports and exports
(thousands of constant pesos base year 1983)
Year GDP Imports Exports
1988 209,892 52,321 51,373
1989 212,209 54,909 55,228
1990 212,840 54,548 62,795
1991 220,372 64,409 64,504
1992 237,851 80,591 70,387
1993 244,142 94,473 76,459
1994 261,951 111,734 88,038
1995 258,159 108,341 86,403
1996 272,559 120,617 95,287
1997 286,317 136,593 107,695
1998 299,311 147,013 108,055
1999 290,791 138,503 100,099
2000 286,600 138,600 106,467
2001 276,898 128,785 96,748
GDP: gross domestic product, M: imports, X: exports.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Uruguayan Central Bank
(Banco Central del Uruguay).
Peluffo SpringerPlus 2013, 2:219 Page 4 of 19
http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/219bargain collectively with the return to democracy in 1985.
As part of its anti-inflationary policy, the national govern-
ment –Sanguinetti’s administration- played a significant
role in negotiations. Since then, labor regulations can be
superseded by collective agreements. They can go beyond
these restrictions increasing the benefits that workers haveTable 2 Evolution of the openness coefficient (OI) and
import penetration (IP) and exports ratio
Year 0I IP X/GDP
1988 0.49 0.25 0.24
1989 0.52 0.26 0.26
1990 0.55 0.26 0.30
1991 0.58 0.29 0.29
1992 0.63 0.34 0.30
1993 0.70 0.39 0.31
1994 0.76 0.43 0 34
1995 0.75 0.42 0 33
1996 0.79 0.44 0 35
1997 0.85 0.48 0 38
1998 0.85 0.49 0 36
1999 0.82 0.48 0 34
2000 0.86 0,48 0 37
2001 0.81 0.47 0 35
OI: openness coefficient defined as (Exports + Imports)/GDP and IP: import
penetration ratio defined as M/GDP and the export ratio is defined
as Exports/GDP.
Source: own elaboration based on data from the Uruguayan Central Bank
(Banco Central del Uruguay).in the area of minimum wages, working conditions, job se-
curity and employment benefits. Tripartite negotiations
took place at the industry level through “Wage Councils”,
allowing wage adjustment to vary by industry. If an agree-
ment met the government anti-inflationary target, then it
would apply to all firms in the industry –even those with
non-union workforces- once the agreement was officially
endorsed.
In 1991 –Lacalle’s administration- the government
stopped participating in this system, though some bar-
gaining was still conducted through industry wide Wage
Councils, but was increasingly done at the firm level. By
1992 the contracts signed under the Wage Council system
have expired. Furthermore, union density fell from 42 per-
cent to 22 percent in 1993 and stayed in that level since
then (Cassoni et al. 2004).
In summary, under the period analyzed in this work
there was two different bargaining regimes: 1)1985-1991
when there was a tripartite bargaining; and 2) from 1992
till 2005, when the government did not participate in
bargaining.
By the end of the 90s the share of manufacturing
product in gross domestic product (GDP) as well as the
number of manufacturing firms has decreased substan-
tially and the unemployment rose. In Table 3 we present
the share of manufacturing product in GDP, while in
Table 4 we present the employment rate, the number of
persons employed and the unemployment rate and the
number of persons unemployed. We can observe an
increase in unemployment in the Uruguayan economy
during the period.Table 3 Share of manufacturing product in GDP
Year GDP MGP* MGP/GDP
1988 209,892 55,667 0.27
1989 212,209 55,560 0.26
1990 212,840 54,750 0.26
1991 220,372 54,464 0.25
1992 237,851 50,328 0.21
1993 244,142 55,296 0.23
1994 261,951 50,361 0.19
1995 258,159 50,877 0.20
1996 272,559 52,918 0.19
1997 286,317 56,023 0.20
1998 299,311 57,330 0.19
1999 290,791 52,514 0.18
2000 286,600 51,424 0.18
2001 276,898 47,537 0.17
*MGP: Manufacturing gross product in thousands of constant pesos, base
year 1983.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Uruguayan Central Bank
(Banco Central del Uruguay).







No. of persons unemployed
(thousands)
1988 52.2 1,077.30 8.6 101.9
1989 53.1 1,108.40 8 95.2
1990 53.5 1,110.60 8.5 102.1
1991 523 1,125.40 8.9 109.9
1992 52.2 1,14290 9 113.2
1993 52 1,156.00 8.3 105.4
1994 52.8 1,18690 9.2 121.1
1995 53 1,206.00 10.3 137.5
1996 513 1,174.80 11.9 159.1
1997 51 1,172.40 11.4 151.5
1998 54.3 1,10310 10.1 123.8
1999 52.6 1,082.10 11.3 137.7
2000 51.5 1,067.60 13.6 167.7
2001 51.4 1,076.20 15.3 193.2
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE).
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Methodology
This paper use a difference-in-differences methodology
which allows to study the impact of increased trade ex-
posure due to the creation of the Mercosur (the treat-
ment) on the tradable sector (treated group) relative to
individuals working in industries that did not increase
their exposure to foreign competition (control group).
We estimate regressions equations in double differences
without matching as well as matching and double-
differences.
Regression equations (DID)
In the case of regression equations our baseline equation
to estimate is the following:
Y it ¼ βo þ βLTTit þ βxXit þ Dj þ dt þ εit ð1Þ
where Yit is the outcome for household i at time t. As
outcome variables we consider monthly labor earnings,
total hourly labor earnings, hourly wages, hourly labor
earnings in monetary terms and in-kind, unemployment
probability and wage dispersion. TTit is the trade
liberalization variable on the treated individuals, i.e. the
treatment on the treated. It is constructed by interacting
individuals working in the manufacturing industries
(Libit, where manufacturing = 1 and service or control
group = 0) with a time dummy that takes the value of
one for 1996 (five years after the creation of the
MERCOSUR). Dj stands for industry dummies and dt
for a time dummy.As treatment group we consider those individuals work-
ing in the manufacturing (tradable) sector while as non-
tradable we consider the public employees as explained
below.
Xit is a set of control variables or covariates which in-
cludes age, marital status, head of the household, sex,
hours worked the week before to the survey, and school-
ing years.
As we mention before, to construct the liberalization
variable (TTit), we define the treated group as those indi-
viduals working in the tradable industries (Libit) after
MERCOSUR’s creation. Our control group is integrated
by individuals working in the public sector, which are
likely to be less affected by trade openness. We should
note that this definition of the tradable and non-tradable
groups is not free of criticism, namely since it could
exist contagion between both groups. In this regard,
Barraud and Calfat (2008) analyzing the effect of trade
liberalization on wages for Argentina find evidence of
significant impacts of trade liberalization on several non-
tradable sectors as well as an important shift of manu-
facturing workers to services, which would indicate that
the service sector is also likely to be affected by trade
liberalization.
Nevertheless, using public employees as control group
has the advantage that they have different characteristics
relative to the private sector employees regarding to the
conditions of entry, the possibilities of lay-offs, and the
setting of their wages. Further, from the data we ob-
served that unemployment rates for the control group
selected is significantly lower than for the manufacturing
one. In this regard, we analyze the proportion of
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manufacturing and 26% from the service sector, corrob-
orating the assumption that manufacturing is by large
more affected due to trade liberalization than the control
group.k
Another reason for choosing public servants as control
group, related to the above, is that there is a lower inter-
sectoral mobility between both groups since there are in-
stitutional and traditional barriers to entry in the public
sector, preventing workers from the industrial sector to
move freely into some government jobs. Furthermore
labor skills are usually specific to each sector, and this
would also be a factor restricting mobility between both
groups. Aside these characteristics, which could help to
prevent contagion, we can assume that public employees
share a similar set of characteristics with those working
in the manufacturing sector, that is to say, the individ-
uals in the treatment group.l
Finally, in a similar work for the Argentinean case
Barraud (2009) uses services as control group.
We also tried different definitions of control groups
based on different aggregations of public workers
according to the sector in which they work as shown in
Table 5.
Thus, we work with civil servants in Public Adminis-
tration and Defense and “Social and other community
and related services” (emp_pub4) as control group, since
it has enough number of observations to conduct the
analysis and excludes public workers that belong to in-
dustries that were affected by increased trade openness
such as some public enterprises as refineries (ANCAP)
and financial services.
Variables were deflated by the price deflator so they
are expressed in real terms with base in December 2006.
Matching and double differences
The effect of Mercosur’s creation is the estimated differ-
ence-in-difference of the outcome variable (earnings,Table 5 Definitions of control groups
Variable Definition
emp_pub1 Public Workers in all sectors
emp_pub2 Public workers in the division “Community Social
and Personal Services” – excludes public enterprises
emp_pub3 Public workers in the division “Community Social
and Personal Services – excludes public enterprises –
and “Personal and Household Services” as well as
“International Organizations”
emp_pub4 Public workers “Public Administration and Defense“
and ”Social and other community and related
services”
emp_pub5 Public workers in “Social and other community and
related services”
Source: Own elaboration.hourly wage, probability of unemployment and wage
dispersion) between the treated and the control groups.
The difference-in-difference methodology is implemented
using a double-robust estimator with inverse probability
weighting and difference-in-differences estimation. We
use a matching and difference-in-differences methodology
which allows studying the causal effect of increasing trade
liberalization (the treatment) on individuals which belong
to the tradable group (the treated) relative to individuals
that were not –or at least into a lower extent- affected by
the opening of the economy (the control group). Thus,
our aim is to evaluate the causal effect the creation of the
Mercosur on Y, where Y represent monthly earnings, total
hourly labor earnings, hourly wages, unemployment prob-
ability and wage dispersion. Y is referred to as the “out-
come” in the evaluation literature.m
Let increased trade openness due to Mercosur’s cre-
ation (TT) where TTit ∈ {0, 1} denotes an indicator
(dummy variable) of whether household i has been ex-
posed to increased trade openness- and Y 1i;tþs is the out-
come at t + s, after Mercosur’s creation, i.e. after 1991.
Also denote by Y 0i;tþs the outcome of household i had it
not been exposed to increased trade openness. The
causal effect of the treatment on the treated (TT) for
household i at period (t + s), and the response variable




The fundamental problem of causal inference is that
the quantity Y 0i;tþs, referred as the counterfactual, is
unobservable. Causal inference relies on the construc-
tion of the counterfactual, which is the outcome the
individuals would have experienced on average had they
not been exposed to increased trade openness. The
counterfactual is estimated by the corresponding average
value of individuals that do not have experienced an in-
creased in trade exposure. An important issue in the
construction of the counterfactual is the selection of a
valid control group and to this end me make use of
matching techniques.
The basic idea of matching is to select from the
group of individuals belonging to the control group
those in which the distribution of the variables Xit
affecting the outcome is as similar as possible to the
distribution of the individuals belonging to the treated
group. The matching procedure consists on linking
each treated individual with the same values of the Xit.
We adopt two different matching methods which
make use of the “propensity score matching”. To this
end, we first identify the probability of being exposed
to increased trade openness (the “propensity score”)
for all individuals, irrespective if they belong to the
Table 6 Number and percentage of observations in the
control and treated groups– 1988 and 1996, urban areas
with more than 900 inhabitants
1988 1996
Observations % Observations %
Control group 3863 51.3 3054 53.7
Treated group 3667 48.7 2631 46.3
Total 7530 100 5685 100
Source: Own elaboration based on ECH 1988 and 1996.
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There are several matching techniques, and in this
work we use double-robust estimators with inverse
probability weighting. Inverse probability weighting
derives weights from the propensity score, where these
weights are defined by the inverse of the propensity
score if the individual receives treatment and the
inverse of one minus the propensity score if the indi-
vidual is in the control group. Further, inverse prob-
ability weighting should mitigate the problem when
there are not common trends between the treated and
the control group.
A matching procedure is preferable to randomly or
arbitrarily choosing the comparison group because it is
less likely to suffer from selection bias by picking up in-
dividuals with markedly different characteristics.
As Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) point out, a combi-
nation of matching and difference-in-difference is likely
to improve the quality of non-experimental evaluation
studies. The difference-in-difference approach is a
two-step procedure. Firstly, the difference between the
average outcome variable before and after the treat-
ment is estimated for firms belonging to the treated
group, conditional on a set of covariates (Xit). How-
ever, this difference cannot be attributed only to in-
creased trade openness since the outcome variables
might be affected by other macroeconomic factors,
such as policies aimed to stabilization of the economy.
To deal with this the difference obtained at the first
stage is further differenced with respect to the before
and after difference for the control group.
The difference-in-difference estimator therefore removes
effects of common shocks and provides a more accurate
description of the impact of the trade liberalization on
labor markets. Furthermore, the double-robust estimator
offers increased protection against model misspecification
and also gives unbiased estimates of the treatment effect
when the models are correctly specified, allowing so to
obtain more accurate results (Emsley et al. 2008).
Data sources and variables
Data come from the Continuous Household Survey
(ECH) for the years 1988 and 1996, recorded by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). These surveys
are representative of urban areas with more than 900 in-
habitants in the whole country.
Due to data availability we work with the main occu-
pation. Also, for the sake of simplicity we consider only
the employees and drop from the sample owners, inde-
pendents workers and cooperative members, and indi-
viduals with less than 18 years and more than 65 years.
Thus, the treated group is defined as those individuals
whose main occupation is as workers in Manufactures
while the control group is composed by public workersin “Public Administration and Defense” and “Social and
other community and related services” as main occupa-
tion.n In Table 6 we present the number of observation
in each group and year.
As can be observed from Table 6, the control group
represents a slightly higher number of observations of
the total sample for the two years considered in this
work. The outcome variables considered regarding earn-
ings and wages are monthly earnings, total hourly labor
earnings –including leave pays and bonuses-, hourly
wages and hourly earnings (monetary and in-inkind and
excluding leave pays and bonuses). As we have men-
tioned before all the income variables are in real terms
with base December 2006. Furthermore we analyze the
probability of unemployment, estimated through a logit
model,o and wage dispersion.
Monthly labor earnings are composed by all the net
incomes from the main occupation, i.e. monetary wages
and wages in-kind, commissions, bonuses, leave pays,
tips and others compensations. To estimate the total
hourly labor earnings we divide monthly earnings by the
hours worked in the week in the main occupation, i.e.
the one that represents the main earnings.p Hourly
wages considers exclusively the monetary earnings (wage
and commissions) per hour in the main occupation in
monetary terms, while hourly labor earnings takes into
account wages and earnings in-kind and exclude bo-
nuses and holiday pays.
In order to analyze wage inequality we defined the
average value of the 80th percentile of total hourly wages
and monthly labor earningsq and compute the ratio of
these values over hourly labor earnings and monthly
labor earnings for each individual generating the vari-
ables named gap2 and gap3 respectively at the 2 digit
ISIC level.r
In Table 7 we summarize the main features of the vari-
ables considered in this work for the years 1988 and
1996 while in Table 8 we present total hourly and in-
come wage gaps.
We can observe an increase in income and wage gaps
in the period with and important decreased in the stand-
ard deviation, pointing out to an increased dispersion of
these variables.
Table 7 Descriptive statistics– 1988 and 1996, urban areas with more than 900 inhabitants
1988
Total Treated Non-treated
No. Obs. Average S.E. No. Obs. Average S.E. No. Obs. Average S.E.
Outcome Variables Monthly earnings 7530 10741.35 9024.929 3667 11043.48 10811.73 3863 10454.55 6903.341
Total hourly labor earnings* 7530 60.9388 58.64012 3667 56.18011 65.61545 3863 65.45604 50.74353
Hourly wages (hourly monetary wage) 7530 51.93759 49.93657 3667 48.62609 57.96903 3863 55.08107 40.63559
Hourly labor earnings (monetary and in-kind)** 7530 54.37341 50.49756 3667 49.80618 58.25184 3863 58.70891 41.37124
Unemployment probability 7530 0.0692962 0.0619908 3667 0.0811074 0.073021 3863 0.0580843 0.0466049
Control Variables Montevideo 7530 0.4742364 0.499369 3667 0.5396782 0.4984911 3863 0.4121149 0.4922793
Sex (man = 1) 7530 0.6258964 0.4839227 3667 0.6817562 0.4658582 3863 0.5728708 0.4947254
Age 7530 37.39867 11.66889 3667 36.18871 12.28136 3863 38.54724 10.93454
Squared Age 7530 1534.806 928.4611 3667 1460.413 959.5702 3863 1605.423 892.3375
Head of household 7530 0.5017264 0.5000302 3667 0.4935915 0.5000271 3863 0.5094486 0.4999754
Schooling years 7530 9.2 4.156597 3667 7.862285 3.148509 3863 10.46984 4.57823
Hours worked 7530 44.49588 15.3459 3667 47.36215 12.90632 3863 41.77505 16.90496
Number of jobs 7530 1.133599 0.3818153 3667 1.065176 0.2566215 3863 1.19855 0.4615489
1996
Total Treated Non-Treated
No. Obs. Average S.E. No. Obs. Average S.E. No. Obs. Average S.E.
Outcome Variables Monthly earnings 5685 11577.71 10108.74 2631 12139.73 12448.73 3054 11093.54 7499.512
Total hourly labor earnings 5685 68.16526 59.86078 2631 62.94509 63.4181 3054 72.66239 56.24047
Hourly monetary wages (hourly monetary wage) 5685 57.16029 52.29815 2631 53.01425 54.94132 3054 60.73208 49.64109
Hourly labor earnings (monetary and in-kind) 5685 62.68532 53.21773 2631 57.97227 55.72992 3054 66.74558 50.61269
Unemployment probability 5666 0.0938942 0.072972 2625 0.1156789 0.0840809 3041 0.0750897 0.0552922
Control Variables Montevideo 5685 0.517854 0.4997251 2631 0.5549221 0.4970689 3054 0.4859201 0.4998836
Sex (man = 1) 5685 0.5825858 0.4931758 2631 0.6913721 0.462015 3054 0.4888671 0.4999579
Age 5685 38.24468 11.72058 2631 35.75067 12.20706 3054 40.39325 10.83565
Squared Age 5685 1600.003 932.6359 2631 1427.066 945.2063 3054 1748.988 895.4232
Head of household 5685 0.4666667 0.4989315 2631 0.4583808 0.4983596 3054 0.4738048 0.4993951
Schooling years 5666 9.965055 3.963805 2625 8.590476 3.123522 3041 11.15159 4.221075
Hours worked 5685 42.26684 14.08965 2631 45.75675 10.95456 3054 39.26031 15.70613
Number of jobs 5683 1.146402 0.3967028 2631 1.066515 0.2625988 3052 1.215269 0.4726435
*Include leave pays and bonuses; **Excludes leave pays and bonuses; S.E.: standard errors.













Table 8 Hourly and total income wage gaps
Hourly wage gap (gap2) 1988 1996
Average 2.965 3.781
Standard Dev. 2.668 29.71
No. Observations 7530 5681
Monthly labor earnings gap (gap3)
Average 2.88 3.625
Standard Dev. 3.722 22.46
No. Observations 7530 5681
Source: Own elaboration based on ECH 1988 and 1996.
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Difference-in-difference regressions
Following the methodology presented en Section 4 we
estimate regression equations in double differences in
order to estimate the impact of the increased trade
openness due to Mercosur’s creation, on a selected
group of impact variables regarding labor earnings and
wages, unemployment probability and wage dispersion.
We choose to focus our analysis mainly for the period
1988–1996, this is five years after the creation of the
Southern Common Market, since generally it is assumed
that the initial shock and the reallocation of resources
due to trade liberalization will operate in a four/five year
period, while dynamic effects will take a longer period to
be felt.
Firstly we analyze the results obtained for earnings
and wages: monthly earnings, total hourly labor earn-
ings, hourly wages, and hourly monetary and in-kind
earnings. From the t-test analysiss we can observe that
monthly earnings are significantly higher for the treated
than for the control group in both years, while hourly
wages are significantly higher in both years for the con-
trol group and the unemployment rate is significantly
higher in the treated for both years. In Table 9 we
present the results for the difference-in-differences re-
gressions without matching.
Mercosur’s creation shows a positive effect on the
monthly earnings, hourly monetary wage and hourly
labor earnings of the workers affected by increased trade
openness, i.e. those workers in the Manufacturing indus-
try. Nevertheless, the treatment is not significant for
total hourly earnings.
The control variables behave as expected and are sig-
nificant in all the cases. In line with previous studies
incomes are higher in Montevideo in relation with the
rest of the urban areas, higher for men and head of
the household. Furthermore, earnings increase with the
schooling years and age. With regard to age it could be
observed that the coefficient associated to squared age is
negative, which would imply that the effect of age is not
linear but quadratic, i.e. as age increases income increases
at a decreasing rate as expected.Regarding to the probability of unemployment the im-
pact of Mercosur’s creation is positive and significant,
which implies that increasing trade openness increases
unemployment probability. Once again the control
variables have the expected signs and are significant
except for the variable hours worked, indicating that the
probability of unemployment is not associated with the
amount of hours worked previously to dismissal. Fur-
thermore, from the estimation of the probability of un-
employment we find that it is higher in Montevideo –
which concentrates half of the population- and it is
lower for males, head of families, married and more edu-
cated individuals.t
There are various possible reasons behind these results.
On one side from the analysis of unemployment probabil-
ity we observe that individuals with higher education were
most likely to keep their jobs, translating so in higher
wages for individuals that stayed employed. Furthermore,
in the country during the 90s there was a rise in firm’s
productivity for those firms that survive increasing trade
openness (Casacuberta et al. 2004) which could also
explain higher salaries. In this regard Casacuberta et al.
(2004) find that the manufacturing sector, in response to
reductions in trade barriers, undertook a technological
change in favor of more capital intensive technologies.
This brought a progressive and systematic increase in
average labor productivity, though not in capital product-
ivity. This resulted in increased in total factor productivity
during the nineties at an annual average rate higher than 3
percent. Thus, higher competition through tariff reduc-
tions, as well as the availability of cheaper and better inter-
mediate and capital goods may be behind the higher
productivity. These authors also find significant job de-
struction rates, which are explained mainly by exiting and
downsizing of firms.
Similar results regarding higher unemployment following
trade liberalization were found for Argentina (Barraud,
2009) and Brazil (Menezes-Filho et al. 2011). For the
Brazilian case increased unemployment is consistent
with faster productivity growth than sales expansion, so
that output shifts to more productive firms while labor
does not –it remains unallocated or shifts to less pro-
ductive firms-. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) find that
the levels of employment fell during the nineties for
Argentina and Uruguay, and an increase in the skill
premium. Further, they find that employment has
moved against manufacturing and in favor of services.
For Uruguay there was also some growth in employment
in some services sectors, in particular those related to
financial and services to enterprises, construction, and in
a lesser extent electricity, gas and water, and telecommu-
nications –which are not considered in our control group-
. Also, in both countries there was a rise in the educational
level of the labor force.
Table 9 Results of the estimation of regression equations in double differences, 1988-1996
Variables Monthly earnings Total hourly earnings Hourly monetary wage Hourly labor earnings Unemployment probability Ln gap2 Ln gap3
Treatment 0.0624*** 0.0137 0.0292* 0.0282* 0.0124*** 0.0760*** 0.156***
(0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0160) (0.0007) (0.0131) (0.0134)
Montevideo 0.192*** 0.184*** 0.167*** 0.176*** 0.0127*** −0.180*** −0.171***
(0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0004) (0.00923) (0.00940)
Sex 0.217*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.122*** −0.0358*** −0.201*** −0.161***
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0007) (0.0124) (0.0127)
Age 0.0467*** 0.0426*** 0.0378*** 0.0386*** −0.0193*** −0.0431*** −0.0510***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.00282) (0.00291)
Age^2 −0.000448*** −0.000379*** −0.000286*** −0.000325*** 0.000201*** 0.000417*** 0.000488***
(3.60e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.59e-05) (3.49e-05) (2.05e-06) (3.54e-05) (3.65e-05)
Head of household 0.177*** 0.139*** 0.0787*** 0.101*** −0.0321*** −0.182*** −0.166***
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0006) (0.0122) (0.0124)
Schooling years 0.0496*** 0.0633*** 0.0731*** 0.0657*** −0.00382*** −0.0514*** −0.0595***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (6.71e-05) (0.00132) (0.00134)
Marital status 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.0820*** 0.101*** −0.00132*** 0.0119*** −0.00815***
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0005) (0.000353) (0.000377)
Hours worked 0.0101*** 3.53e-06 −0.130*** −0.122***
(0.0004) (1.56e-05) (0.0105) (0.0108)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.768*** 2.043*** 1.880*** 2.007*** 0.551*** 2.268*** 3.257***
(0.0576) (0.0553) (0.0537) (0.0523) (0.0039) (0.0565) (0.0585)
Observations 13,196 13,196 13,144 13,164 13,196 13,192 13,192
R-squared 0.356 0.336 0.346 0.342 0.888 0.364 0.357
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Lngap2: average of the upper 80th hourly wage over the wage of the individual; lngap3: average of the upper 80th total income over total income of the individual. Robust standard













Table 10 Results of the estimation of regression equations in double differences, 1986-1987
VARIABLES Monthly earnings Total hourly earnings Hourly monetary wage Hourly labor earnings Unemployment probability Lngap2 Lngap3
Treatment 0.0479*** 0.0394*** 0.112*** 0.0594*** 0.00319*** −0.00981 0.134***
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.000548) (0.0125) (0.0127)
Montevideo 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.00589*** −0.157*** −0.148***
(0.00811) (0.00800) (0.00777) (0.00772) (0.000342) (0.00803) (0.00817)
Sex 0.290*** 0.260*** 0.229*** 0.248*** −0.0452*** −0.273*** −0.241***
(0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.000604) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Age 0.0515*** 0.0490*** 0.0390*** 0.0408*** −0.0192*** −0.0491*** −0.0564***
(0.00258) (0.00254) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.000156) (0.00254) (0.00260)
Age^2 −0.000536*** −0.000499*** −0.000352*** −0.000396*** 0.000200*** 0.000503*** 0.000581***
(3.25e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.10e-05) (3.09e-05) (1.81e-06) (3.19e-05) (3.28e-05)
Head of household 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.0794*** 0.109*** −0.0262*** −0.133*** −0.127***
(0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.000479) (0.0109) (0.0111)
Schooling years 0.0451*** 0.0510*** 0.0563*** 0.0517*** −0.00240*** −0.0499*** −0.0547***
(0.00116) (0.00114) (0.00108) (0.00109) (4.89e-05) (0.00115) (0.00115)
Marital status 0.00857*** −0.0122*** −0.0145*** −0.0133*** 2.05e-05* 0.0119*** −0.00725***
(0.000316) (0.000304) (0.000297) (0.000291) (1.22e-05) (0.000304) (0.000310)
Hours worked 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.1000*** 0.112*** −0.00300*** −0.138*** −0.136***
(0.00969) (0.00950) (0.00906) (0.00901) (0.000405) (0.00954) (0.00985)
Industry dummies −0.104*** −0.133*** −0.0638*** −0.119*** 0.00248*** 0.0376** 0.160***
(0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.000612) (0.0148) (0.0153)
Time dummy −0.199*** −0.217*** −0.128*** −0.199*** −0.000682 −0.0713*** 0.0305
(0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.000859) (0.0226) (0.0229)
Constant 6.759*** 2.506*** 2.584*** 2.605*** 0.545*** 2.215*** 3.147***
(0.0511) (0.0508) (0.0495) (0.0490) (0.00349) (0.0510) (0.0515)
Observations 15,296 15,296 15,194 15,222 15,296 15,296 15,296
R-squared 0.347 0.409 0.445 0.430 0.905 0.399 0.378
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Lngap2: average of the upper 80th hourly wage over the wage of the individual; lngap3: average of the upper 80th total income over total income of the individual. Robust standard













Table 11 Results of the estimation of matching and difference-in-differences with double-robust estimates and inverse
probability weighting, 1988-1996
Outcome variable Coefficient Standard error z
Monthly earnings 0.0663 0.0137 4.84***
Hourly labor earnings (monetary) 0.0493 0.0136 3.63***
Hourly wages 0.0512 0.0133 3.84***
Hourly labor earnings 0.0512 0.0132 3.87***
Unemployment probability 0.0206 0.0005 39.07***
Dispersion in hourly wages (lngap2) 0.0710 0.0137 5.2***
Dispersion in total income (lngap3) 0.1771 0.0138 12.82***
All variables are in natural logarithms.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1988 and 1996.
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http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/219On the other hand, the results for wage dispersion
point out an increase in dispersion, both for monthly
earnings and hourly earnings after Mercosur’s creation.
This result can be a consequence of the increase in the
skill premium due to the technological modernization in
this period. In this regard, it is widely accepted that
skilled labor is a complement to more intensive capital
technologies, which could explain the rise in the demand
for qualified work and the increase in dispersion, issue
that we analyze below.
Finally, we perform a placebo test using the years
1986–1987, finding also increases in wages, though with
a lower magnitude for monthly earnings, unemployment
probability and total income dispersion, and a not
significant effects for hourly wage dispersion (Table 10).
This would give some confidence that for these variables
results would be reliable, though when applying double
robust estimation and inverse probability weighting
common trends between treated and control groups
should not be an issue.
Matching and difference-in-difference
We use double robust estimators and inverse probability
weighting using the distribution of the treated after theTable 12 Outcomes according to gender, 1988-1996
Outcome variables Females, 88-96
Coefficient Standard erro
Monthly earnings −0.0632 0.0391
Hourly labor earnings (monetary) −0.0591 0.0389
Hourly wages −0.1468 0.0378
Hourly labor earnings −0.0378 0.0371
Unemployment probability 0.0121 0.0012
Dispersion in hourly wages (lngap2) 0.1384 0.0390
Dispersion in total income (lngap3) 0.3686 0.0393
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1988 and 1996.treatment to select the match from the control group. A
double-robust estimator allows obtaining unbiased in-
ference when adjusting for selection effects such as
confoundingu by allowing for different forms of model
misspecification. Furthermore, it can also offer increased
efficiency when the model is correctly specified (Emsley
et al., 2008). We further tested that the balancing tests
were satisfied.v
As a placebo we tried as control group all public workers
(emp_pub1)w which includes workers in the financial sec-
tor, services to enterprises, and public enterprises (electri-
city, gas and water, refineries, and telecommunications
state enterprises). Thus, we compare our treated group
with a control group that could have some contagion prob-
lem since now all public workers are included, not only
those working in public administration and defense and
social related services –which is our preferred control
group-. We expect that, using this control group –which
may be most likely affected by contagion- there is still an
effect of MERCOSUR, lower than when they compare
with our preferred control.We present the results in
Table 11, and find that for monthly earnings, hourly labor
earning (monetary and in-kind) and hourly wages the
effect of treatment is not significant, except for hourlyMales, 88-96
r z Coefficient Standard error z
−1.62 0.1008 0.0150 6.73***
−1.52 0.0843 0.0148 5.69***
−3.88*** 0.1270 0.0140 9.09***
−1.02 0.1264 0.0137 9.23***
9.91*** 0.0198 0.0006 34.52***
3.55*** 0.0198 0.0149 1.32
9.39*** 0.1017 0.0150 6.79***
Table 13 Outcomes according to schooling years, 1988-1996
Outcome variable More than 9 years of schooling Less than 9 years of schooling
Coefficient Standard error z Coefficient Standard eError z
Monthly earnings 0.1791 0.0313 5.73*** 0.0144 0.0157 0.92
Hourly labor earnings (monetary) 0.1518 0.0316 4.8*** −0.0009 0.0153 −0.06
Hourly wages 0.1629 0.0307 5.31*** 0.0108 0.0154 0.7
Hourly labor earnings 0.1960 0.0301 6.5*** 0.0365 0.0148 2.47**
Unemployment probability 0.0091 0.0009 10.74*** 0.0245 0.0007 33.95***
Dispersion in hourly wages (lngap2) −0.0654 0.0317 −2.06** 0.1011 0.0154 6.57***
Dispersion in total income (lngap3) 0.1289 0.0313 4.12*** 0.1762 0.0159 11.08***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1988 and 1996.
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our preferred control group (emp_pub4). On the other
hand we find that unemployment probability is relatively
similar while wage dispersion variables may be questioned
since they are slightly higher.
Thus using double robust estimators and inverse prob-
ability weighting we find a positive effect of Mercosur’s
creation on earnings and wages for all the definitions
tried, a rise in the probability of unemployment and in-
creases in wage dispersion. The results regarding to the
increase in unemployment and increased wage disper-
sion in manufacturing during the 1990s is consistent
with previous empirical works for the country (Vaillant
and Casacuberta, 2002; Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003).
Furthermore, in the 90s there was an increase in the skill
premium of qualified workers as well as technological
modernization that took place during this decade. On
the other hand the increase in labor earnings of indivi-
duals who have stayed employed may also be consistent
with the fact that more educated individuals were in bet-
ter position to keep their jobs as we show below.
We further analyze the outcomes variables by gender
and schooling years. Splitting the sample by gender we
find significant increases in earnings for men while for
women the effects are not significant or even negative
(see Table 12). Thus, it seems that increases in real
wages are mainly driven by increases in men wages.Table 14 Placebo using as control group all the public worke
Outcome variable Coefficient
Monthly earnings 0.0663
Hourly labor earnings (monetary) 0.0493
Hourly wages 0.0512
Hourly labor earnings 0.0512
Unemployment probability 0.0206
Dispersion in hourly wages (lngap2) 0.0710
Dispersion in total income (lngap3) 0.1771
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1988 and 1996.Further, unemployment probability and wage dispersion
are lower for men compared to women. We also note
that women are more educated than men. Taking the
average for both years (1988 and 1996) for treated and
control groups we find that women in average have
10.89 years of schooling while men only 8.65, with a
total average of 9.53 years. In 1988 the average year of
schooling for women was 10.56 years –for treated and
control groups- while for mean the average was 8.39,
and the total average of 9.2 years of schooling. In 1996
there is a moderate rise in years of schooling with an
average for women of 11.33 and for men of 8.89 and a
total average of 9.82 years of schooling. Further we note
that the control group is composed by more educated
people (10.46 years of schooling for the control group
and 7.86 for the treated in 1988, while in 1996 these fig-
ures are of 10.57 and 8.59 respectively).
For schooling years we split the sample for individuals
with levels of education higher than the sample median
for both years (9 years) and those with lower education.
Results are reported in Tables 13 and 14. We find high
and significant increases in real wages for more educated
individuals, and a lower probability of unemployment
that for less educated ones. Moreover, hourly wage dis-
persion changes sign and becomes negative, pointing out
to a reduction in wage dispersion among high skilled









Table 15 For several years double-robust estimates for time periods
Time period
Outcome variable 88-92 88-93 88-94 88-95 88-96 88-97 88-98
Monthly earnings 0.1749 −0.0211 0.1249 0.1056 0.0663 0.0075 0.0620
(0.0112)*** (0.0112) (0.0124)*** (0.0146)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0137) (0.0151)***
Hourly labor earnings (monetary) 0.1565 −0.0408 0.1098 0.1021 0.0493 0.0001 0.0611
(0.0110)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0174)*** (0.01356)*** (0.0132) (0.0142)***
Hourly wages 0.1385 −0.0410 0.0983 0.0952 0.0512 −0.0262 0.0335
(0.0112)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0182)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0142) (0.0139)**
Hourly labor earnings 0.1646 −0.0253 0.1375 0.1333 0.0512 0.0089 0.0841
(0.0119)*** (0.0111)** (0.0121)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0127) (0.0138)***
Unemployment probability 0.0041 −0.0010 0.0040 0.0123 0.0206 0.0308 0.0178
(0.0005)*** (0.0005)** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0005)***
Dispersion in hourly wages 0.0008 −0.1460 0.0340 −0.0503 0.0103 −0.0639 −0.0293
(lngap2) (0.0110) (0.0111)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0137) (0.0128)*** (0.0142)**
Dispersion in total income 0.1662 −0.0590 0.1685 0.1498 0.1771 0.0532 0.1663
(lngap3) (0.0113)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0151)***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.






















Treatment 1.489*** 0.0123 0.0498*** 0.0417*** 0.0245***
(0.0161) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.000569)
Montevideo 0.118*** 0.230*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.00693***
(0.0178) (0.00996) (0.0100) (0.00971) (0.000450)
Sex 0.235*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.186*** −0.0289***
(0.0228) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.000701)
Age 0.0775*** 0.0467*** 0.0434*** 0.0443*** −0.0179***
(0.0055) (0.00314) (0.00309) (0.00302) (0.000185)
Age2 −0.00070*** −0.000432*** −0.000356*** −0.000398*** 0.000186***
(6.95e-05) (3.93e-05) (3.87e-05) (3.79e-05) (2.14e-06)
Head 0.174*** 0.143*** 0.0846*** 0.107*** −0.0397***
(0.0235) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.000595)
Education 0.0919*** 0.0655*** 0.0762*** 0.0677*** −0.00442***
(0.00261) (0.00144) (0.00141) (0.00138) (7.11e-05)
Marital status 0.0919*** 0.103*** 0.0728*** 0.0883*** −0.0188***
(0.0212) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.000481)
Hours worked 0.007*** −2.02e-05
(0.00073) (1.87e-05)
Number of works −0.059** 0.0152*** 0.0165** 0.0162** 0.000363
(0.0054) (0.00570) (0.00771) (0.00769) (0.000348)
Constant 3.464*** 1.835*** 1.598*** 1.799*** 0.550***
(0.110) (0.0602) (0.0589) (0.0580) (0.00412)
Observations 12,182 12,182 12,133 12,164 12,182
R-squared 0.360 0.307 0.326 0.305 0.882
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1991 and 1996.
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also in line with the technological modernization, the
improvements in productivity experienced by surviving
firms, which in turn may translate into an increased de-
mand for skilled workers as commented above.
These results would indicate that more educated
people and men in particular, are the ones to win the
most in face of increased trade liberalization.
Finally, we perform one last exercise: we analyze the
effects for several years from 1988–1992 onwards. We
report the results in Table 15. We find that for 1988–
1992 (one year after Mercosur’s creation) a higher im-
pact in earnings variables, a lower probability of un-
employment and not significant hourly wage dispersion
and similar total wage dispersion compared to the
period 1988–1996. Nevertheless, for the period 1988–
1993 we find some unexpected results: mainly a reduc-
tion in all the outcome variables considered. The re-
duction in earnings variables could be explained due
to the expiration of the contracts signed under theWage Council system, and the fall in union density in
1993. Eventually, it could be argued that the fall in
unemployment probability could be a result of a more
flexible labor market. It is harder to pose an explan-
ation for the fall in wage dispersion. One possible
explanation could be by the reduction in the inflation
levels in 1993 as a consequence of the stabilization plan
implemented in 1992.
For the periods 1988–1994 and 1988–1985 we observe
again an important increase in wages, unemployment
and total wage dispersion, while hourly wage dispersion
shows a positive increase in the period 88–94 but then
reverses its sign in 1988–1995.
Finally, for the periods 1988–1996 –commented
above-, 1988–1997 and 1988–1998 there is also a posi-
tive effect on earnings but lower than for the previous
years –with the exception of 1988-1993-, increases in
unemployment probability, and qualitatively similar results
for total earnings dispersion, while hourly wage dispersion
changed sign.
Table 17 Results of the estimation of matching and difference-in-differences with double-robust estimates and inverse
probability weighting, 1991-1996
Coefficient Standard error z
Monthly labor earnings 1.428 0.017 85.41***
Total hourly labor earnings 0.045 0.014 3.23***
Hourly wages (monetary) 0.087 0.013 6.48***
Hourly labor (monetary and in-kind) 0.081 0.013 6.23***
Unemployment Probability 0.022 0.001 40.42***
Dispersion in hourly wages (GAP2) 0.065 0.065 4.53***
Dispersion in total earnings (GAP3) 0.209 0.015 14.28***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH 1991 and 1996.
Peluffo SpringerPlus 2013, 2:219 Page 16 of 19
http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/219Thus, except for 1988–1993 and for the outcome
variable hourly wage dispersion, results are qualitatively
similar to those found five years after Mercosur’s creation.
Consistency checks
Since there were important changes in the methodology
used by the INE in 1991, such as changes in the sam-
pling and the questionnaires applied we try also 1991 as
the baseline year and 1996 as the year after the interven-
tion. We report the results in Tables 16 and 17.
For the DID regressions we find a positive signifi-
cant impact of Mercosur’s creation for monthly labor
earnings, hourly labor earnings, hourly wages (mon-
etary), and hourly labor earnings in money and in
kind, though the estimated coefficient differs from
previous results. Further, increased trade openness
seems to increase the probability of unemployment.
The only difference is that monetary hourly wages
turns out to be positively significant taking 1991 as
baseline year, while it is was not significant when we
take 1988 as baseline.
Also income and wage dispersion shows a similar be-
havior taking 1991 as baseline instead of 1988.
As we commented above Barraud (2009) implemented a
difference-in-difference approach using household surveys
for the years 1988 and 1998, for the Argentinean case.
Barraud define as treated workers in manufacturing indus-
tries and as control the public employees. The main find-
ings were a reduction in monthly and hourly earnings and
increases in the probability of unemployment. Nevertheless
for the Uruguayan case we find increases in wages and also
in the probability of unemployment and a rise in wage dis-
persion.
Concluding remarks
The results for the difference-in-difference regressions
seem to show that increased trade openness due to
Mercosur’s creation has had a positive impact on total
earnings of the treated group, i.e. manufacturingworkers, but when controlling for hours worked it is not
significant which could be pointing out a countervailing
effect due to the hours worked, i.e. the higher income
is due to more hours worked and not a higher hourly
wage. Furthermore, we observe that increased trade
openness impact positively and significantly on the prob-
ability of unemployment of the treated group. Finally,
we observe a positive effect on monthly earnings (in
monetary terms plus in kind) and increases for our three
measures of wage dispersion tried.
Since these results could be affected by differences in
the characteristics of individuals in the treated and con-
trol group we apply double robust estimators finding
significant increases in income and hourly wages as well
in the probability of unemployment and increased wage
dispersion. Thus, our results confirms the findings
by Casacuberta and Vaillant (2002) and Galiani and
Sanguinetti (2003) who working at the industry level
find that Mercosur trade flows have negatively affected
the level of industry employment in Uruguay, but oppos-
ite to the findings by Casacuberta et al. (2002) regarding
to the impact on wages. However their results are obtain
through correlations so they do not have a causal inter-
pretation. In this regard we contribute to the literature
providing a causal nexus between Mercosur’s creation
and labor market outcome and could give us an insight
of the effects of new free trade agreements with rela-
tively more developed countries or blocs. In our research
agenda is to dig deeper into the relations between trade
and labor market outcomes, and if possible to work with
matched employees and firm level data, including as well
into the analysis institutional factors and technological
change.Endnotes
a For a survey on the theoretical links of globalization
and inequality see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
b A large number of multi-country case studies and
econometric studies using cross-country datasets have










Head of household −0.422*** −0.697***
(0.0706) (0.0591)
Schooling years −0.0364*** −0.0945***
(0.00672) (0.00647)





Pseudo R2 0.112 0.0945
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH.
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http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/219tested the empirical validity of the trade-growth relation-
ship but there is no full agreement among economists
concerning the precise nature of this relationship
(Baldwin 2004; Rodriguez y Rodrik 2000; Dollar y Kraay
2004; Loayza, Fajnzylber, y Calderón 2004; Wacziarg y
Welch 2003).
c For a recent theoretical model with unemployment
see Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010).
d Winters et al. (2004) and Hertel and Reimer (2005)
surveyed the effects of trade on income levels.
e The tariff schedule in place before trade liberalization
may also affect the impact of trade on wage inequality. If
protection was higher in the low-skill intensive sectors,
then trade liberalization may actually lead to shrinkage
of these sectors.
f Trefler (2001) for the Canada-US Free Trade Agree-
ment, uses difference-in-differences estimators finding
an important role of tariffs cuts in employment reduc-
tion, but important productivity improvement and that
it takes a seven year period for wages to increase after
trade liberalization.
g Uruguay belongs to the called “early reformers”, that
is to say the countries who first apply the first-gener-
ation reforms in Latin America, including an important
financial liberalization.
h The Asuncion Treaty, signed on the 26th March of
1991 is a regional integration agreement to create the
Southern Common Market. It was signed by Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
i Source: Banco Central del Uruguay
j The exchange rate policy has consequences on the
domestic currency appreciation and through this chan-
nel to trade specialization.
k Furthermore, the percentage of unemployment in
manufacturing for 1996 is of 12.52% while in the control
group is 7.5%.
l A technique to address contagion is to apply general
equilibrium models, but they also are not free of calibra-
tion issues.
m Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) present a review of
the microeconomic evaluation literature.
n According to the definition of the outcome variables
in this work, both groups exclude those who declare to
have worked zero hours in the week previous to the sur-
vey and to those who do not declare income in the
month previous to the survey.
o See the Appendix for details on the estimation of the
probability of unemployment.
p Since earnings are expressed in a monthly basis we
divide the total monthly earnings by 4.3 to obtain the
weekly income. Monthly earnings and hourly labour
earnings include leave pays and bonuses.
q Using the average value of the 80th percentile pro-
tects us against outliers.r Lack of data prevents us from analyzing wage disper-
sion at the 3-digit ISIC level.
s Available upon request.
t See Appendix for details.
u Confounding occurs when there are variables that
can affect the outcome of interest, which are correlated
to the treatment under analysis. Confounding as well as
not common trends can be controlled for using inverse
probability weighting.
v The balancing tests are available upon request.




In this section we provide details on the estimation of
unemployment probability and its behavior for control
and treated groups.
To estimate the probability of unemployment we
first use a logit model, where Pr(y = 1|X) = F(X),
where y is the probability of unemployment and X
are the covariates: Montevideo, Sex, age, squared age,
head of household, education and marital status.
Results are reported in Table 18. After estimating the
β^ we predict the probability of unemployment for
each individual. In Table 19 we present the marginal
effects evaluated at the mean.
Table 19 Marginal effects evaluated at the mean
1988 dy/dx Std. Err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval] Mean
Montevideo 0.00791 0.00242 3.27 0.001 0.0032 0.0127 0.4585
Sex −0.03506 0.00273 −12.85 0 −0.0404 −0.0297 0.5896
Age −0.01047 0.00069 −15.27 0 −0.0118 −0.0091 38.0812
Age^2 0.00010 0.00001 11.92 0 0.0001 0.0001 1610.8420
Head −0.02188 0.00359 −6.1 0 −0.0289 −0.0148 0.4755
Schooling years −0.00189 0.00035 −5.44 0 −0.0026 −0.0012 8.5182
Marital status −0.01565 0.00284 −5.5 0 −0.0212 −0.0101 0.6524
1996 dy/dx Std. Err. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval] Mean
Montevideo 0.01685 0.00317 5.32 0 0.0106 0.0231 0.5259
Sex −0.03012 0.00343 −8.79 0 −0.0368 −0.0234 0.5590
Age −0.01089 0.00085 −12.76 0 −0.0126 −0.0092 38.0718
Age^2 0.00010 0.00001 9.43 0 0.0001 0.0001 1612.9000
Head −0.05366 0.00441 −12.18 0 −0.0623 −0.0450 0.4367
Schooling years −0.00727 0.00048 −15 0 −0.0082 −0.0063 9.2244
Marital status −0.01353 0.00365 −3.71 0 −0.0207 −0.0064 0.6084
Source: Own elaboration base on ECH.
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ginal effect were for individuals living in Montevideo
with an elasticity of 0.0079 in 1988 and of 0.016 in 1996,
and for years of schooling that was of −0.002 in 1988
and of −0.007 in 1996.
For both years, 1988 and 1996, we analyze if the prob-
ability of unemployment were similar between the treat-
ment and the control group by means of a t-test finding
that in fact the probability of unemployment is higher inTable 20 Probability of unemployment, two-sample t test wit
control group = 0; year1988)
Group Obs Mean Std. Err.
0 3526 0.0551943 0.000808
1 3648 0.0874021 0.0013138
combined 7174 0.0715721 0.0008001
diff −0.0322079 0.0015546
diff = mean(0) - mean(1); t = −20.7173; Ho: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 7172.
Table 21 Probability of unemployment, Two-sample t test wit
group = 0, 1996
Group Obs Mean Std. Err.
0 3041 0.0748768 0.001002
1 2625 0.115858 0.001657
combined 5666 0.093863 0.0009758
diff −0.0409813 0.0018797
diff = mean(0) - mean(1); t = −21.8020; Ho: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 5664.the manufacturing sector than in the control group. We
present the results for 1988 in Table 20, in which the
difference between both groups is of 0.03. The same fea-
ture is observed for 1996 but with a slight increase in
unemployment for the treated group (Table 21), and the
difference between both groups is of 0.04.
In 1996 for both groups there is a higher probability of
unemployment than in 1988, before Mercosur´s creation
as can be seen in the Table 22.h equal variances by group (treatment group = 1 and





h equal variances for treatment = 1 and control





Table 22 Probability of unemployment, two-sample t test with equal variances by treatment (intervencion)
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Group
0 7530 0.0692962 0.0007144 0.0619908 0.0678958 0.0706966
1 5666 0.0938942 0.0009694 0.072972 0.0919938 0.0957947
combined 13196 0.0798579 0.0005922 0.0680229 0.0786972 0.0810186
diff −0.024598 0.001177 −0.0269052 −0.0222909
diff = mean(0) - mean(1); t = −20.8985; Ho: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 13194.
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